On June 13, the Supreme Court of India stayed the release of the film Hamare Baarah (Our Twelve), originally called Hum Do, Hamare Barah (Two of Us, Our Twelve), and directed the Bombay High Court to take a final decision. On June 19, the Bombay High Court allowed the film’s release, provided the filmmakers removed certain scenes and inserted disclaimers. Many political leaders in the past have used the slogan “Hum Paanch, Hamare Pachchees” (“Five of Us, Our 25”) to target the Muslim community. This propaganda slogan reiterates the belief that a Muslim man typically has many wives and children leading to rapid population growth among Muslims, which will eventually result in Muslims surpassing the majority Hindu population. Thus, it is important to revisit and reiterate the data that challenges the portrayal of Muslim fertility as a threat.
The latest National Family Health Survey, 2019–20 (NFHS–5), conducted by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW), shows that many states have already attained a replacement level of fertility, and there is a steady decline in India’s total fertility rates (TFR). According to the NHFS-5 data, the TFR in India is 2.0 children per woman up until 2021, which is slightly lower than the replacement level of fertility of 2.1 children per woman. The Economic Survey 2018-19 and the Sample Registration System (SRS) data from 2017 also had similar findings about the deceleration of India’s population growth.
According to the 2011 Census of India, the growth rate of the Muslim population was higher than the Hindu population. The controversy surrounding this single interpretation obscured the fact that the gap between the two growth rates had significantly reduced between 2001 and 2011, a crucial piece of information that contradicts the claims. When comparing the fertility differentials between the two communities using the 2001 and 2011 data, this convergence of fertility between Hindus and Muslims is evident. It comes with the caveat that since different states and groups are at different points in this transition, there are variations between regions in this process of convergence — a fact evidenced by earlier studies.
Another recent analysis taking into account the drop in fertility and the rate of decline in population growth found that the drop in Hindu fertility was five per cent less than the drop in Muslim fertility in the last two decades, where Muslim population growth declined at a faster rate than that of Hindus. This analysis suggested that there may be “absolute convergence” in Hindu-Muslim fertility rates by 2030.
Data from the NFHS shows that the fertility rates of all religious communities have declined over the past two decades. The sharply decreasing family size of Muslims, particularly, is evident since the fertility rate for Muslims has decreased by almost half from 4.4 in 1992–93 to 2.4 in 2020–21. A Pew Research Centre study also stated that there has been an overall decline in fertility rates across religious groups in India, with gaps between religious communities decreasing.
The Population Foundation of India observed that education, healthcare, and socio-economic development significantly impact fertility rates, with states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu showing lower TFRs than Bihar, which had less access to these resources. Thus, what influenced levels of fertility rates was not religion, but rather better socio-economic status and development.
Challenging misinformation
The NFHS 5 data also shows that the higher the level of the mother’s education, the lower the fertility. Across religious groups, Muslims are the most disadvantaged economically, with poorer education and health levels — evident from their lower enrollment levels in higher education. The Sachar Committee Report in 2006 emphasised such socio-economic disparity among Muslims. Thus, the population growth debate should focus on investments in education, economic development, livelihoods, food, nutrition, healthcare, sexual and reproductive health services, and gender justice. Furthermore, women, particularly from marginalised communities, have limited freedom to make fertility decisions and controlled access to contraception and reproductive care.
The rhetoric about the fertility of the Muslim community directly affects Muslim women’s right to have or not have children. This not only violates Muslim women’s right to life and dignity but also affects their subjectivities. Hence, the discussion concerning population growth and fertility must shift focus and centre on sexual and reproductive health rights, individual choice, and resist attempts at co-optation for politically motivated propaganda. To vilify a community through misinformation and then compound their experiences of unjust treatment through the normalisation of this rhetoric is unacceptable, discriminatory, offensive, misleading, and promotes divisiveness. As feminists, it is critical to challenge and resist broader attempts at polarisation by foregrounding facts, data, and a commitment to protect the right to determine reproductive outcomes.
The writers work on gender, fertility, reproductive rights and public health
