The debate on Pakistan and nuclear weapons in the Indian elections might have generated much heat but it has shed little light on Delhi’s emerging nuclear challenges. Nuclear factors have returned to the top of the agenda in the competitive calculus among major powers as well as in key regional theatres like Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Nuclear energy is also back on the civilian radar as the challenges of managing climate change become acute each year. Meanwhile, tech companies are showing unprecedented interest in nuclear power to feed their electricity-guzzling data centres.
There was intense debate in Delhi during the 1990s on the formal acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. It was followed by an all-consuming focus on the terms of reconciliation with the global nonproliferation order under the historic civil nuclear initiative with the US during the 2000s. Since then, there has been little public and political interest in matters nuclear. At the global level, the UN warned a few weeks ago that the world is drifting back to potential nuclear war amid the mounting tensions between the US and Europe on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other.
The Ukraine war in Europe and the Russian rattling of the nuclear sabre are compelling the West to rethink the deterrence dynamic. Strengthening NATO’s nuclear and conventional forces in Europe, greater collaboration between France and Britain (the two European nuclear powers), and building an independent Eurodeterrent under French leadership are some of the ideas that are being explored.
China’s assertiveness and the fear of American isolationism under a potential second term for Donald Trump are nudging Beijing’s Asian neighbours to reconsider their atomic abstinence. For now, Japan and South Korea are negotiating steps to strengthen the American nuclear umbrella; but if Trump wins in November, the debate on national nuclear arsenals is likely to become more serious in North East Asia.
In the Middle East, regional fears about Iran’s emergence as a nuclear weapon power are intensifying the Arab quest for expanded atomic capabilities of their own. Civil nuclear technological cooperation is reported to be an important part of the security pact being negotiated between Saudi Arabia and the US.
Meanwhile, the rise of AI and robotic weapons is generating questions about the dangers of automating nuclear decision-making and its consequences for strategic stability between the major powers. Earlier this month, Washington urged China and Russia to match declarations by the US that only humans, and not algorithms, would be allowed to make decisions on deployment and use of nuclear weapons.
There are growing concerns in the US that Russia plans to deploy anti-satellite nuclear weapons to undermine Washington’s dominance in outer space. Last month, Russia vetoed a US-Japan resolution calling for the prevention of an arms race in space; China abstained.
The current Indian political argument over “who is afraid of Pakistan’s atomic weapons” appears self-indulgent amidst sweeping changes in global nuclear politics and emerging challenges to the traditional ideas of nuclear deterrence.
The question of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and their impact on India’s security is a serious one. Since Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons in the late 1980s, Delhi has struggled to deter Rawalpindi from pursuing cross-border terrorism under the shadow of the atomic gun.
During the last decade, the Modi government sought to limit Pakistan’s atomic impunity and expand India’s options to enhance deterrence. To be sure, there has been some success, but few would claim that the problem of deterring Pakistan’s terrorism has been fixed for good.
Equally unwise is the temptation to dismiss Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. As Pakistan’s comprehensive national power declines in relation to India’s, Delhi must expect that Rawalpindi will double down on its nuclear weapon programme as the final insurance against the much-feared “Indian hegemony” in the region. Delhi’s current rhetoric on taking back Pakistan-occupied Kashmir might well reinforce Rawalpindi’s determination to strengthen its nuclear arsenal.
Rawalpindi has long had a focused nuclear weapons programme and a definite edge over India in terms of the size and sophistication of its arsenal. Pakistan’s continuing strategic partnership with China suggests room for sustaining that edge against India.
It has become commonplace to hear in Delhi that India is no longer bothered about Pakistan and is concentrating its energies on China. While Pakistan’s nuclear challenge continues to simmer, China’s atomic challenge continues to mount. After decades of keeping its nuclear arsenal to a modest size, Beijing is now in the middle of expanding it. According to some Western estimates, China is on track to have an arsenal of 1,000 nuclear weapons by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035.
A leading Chinese scholar on nuclear issues, Tsinghua University’s Tong Zhao, argues that Xi Jinping sees the expanded nuclear arsenal as more than a deterrent against the US. For the Chinese leader, a more powerful arsenal is about ensuring an effective balance of power against the US and underwriting Beijing’s geopolitical leverage. According to Tong Zhao, Xi has appreciated Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “decision to prioritise the development of its nuclear capabilities even as the country’s economy was in decline.” Russia’s threat to use nuclear weapons, arguably, has imposed a significant constraint on the scale and extent of Western support for Ukraine. Beijing will bet that its growing nuclear arsenal will counter Washington’s balancing strategies in Asia.
If China remains India’s principal security challenge, building deterrent capability against Beijing’s expanding nuclear arsenal should be a national priority. This would involve a more purposeful programme to build nuclear and missile capabilities and not just “technology demonstrators” and “symbolic capabilities” that have dominated India’s deterrence. Renewed geopolitical rivalry between major powers is bringing nuclear weapons back to the centre stage of global security politics. Rapid technological developments and new ways of fighting wars demand the modification of traditional ideas of nuclear deterrence.
The next government in Delhi must order a comprehensive review of the changing global nuclear dynamic and regional atomic challenges, and find ways to modernise India’s atomic arsenal and doctrine. The review must also explore ways to accelerate India’s civilian nuclear energy programme. Although India was the first Asian country to build an atomic power plant back in 1969, it has fallen way behind China and South Korea. To catch up, India will need an overhaul of the legal and institutional frameworks governing India’s atomic energy development.
The writer is contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express and visiting professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore
