In this decade and overall, Hindutva has offered its followers symbolic excitement mostly unrelated to life conditions — the systematic marginalisation of the imagined enemy, construction of the Ram temple and limited accommodation of backward castes.
The Hindi belt or the Hindi heartland is a central factor in the shaping of political power in India. In part, this is due to numerical strength — the north accounts for a massive 245 seats to the Lok Sabha and, barring Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir, the Hindi belt has 226 seats. But more than mere strength, it is important because of an underlying uniformity in its approach to socio-cultural matters and in its political behaviour. Historically, the churnings in the Hindi belt have signalled momentous political shifts.
In 1967, the entire Hindi belt registered its disenchantment with the Congress. This shook the Congress system, but more than that, it marked the beginning of a new politics both within Congress and outside it. In 1977, the Hindi belt contributed to the rout of Indira Gandhi’s party and facilitated a reconfiguration of political forces. In both these moments, the deeper churning in the Hindi belt had an undercurrent of social realignments — the unrest of intermediate and backward castes against the continued dominance of upper/forward castes. The realignment politically manifested itself as a protest against the Congress. That logic was further extended in 1989 when Congress was thrown out yet again — more decisively. At all these three points in time, the Hindi belt behaved more or less uniformly.
A fourth moment was the mid-Nineties, when in quick succession, in three elections, the BJP gained handsomely in this region. That marked the entrenchment of Hindutva politics in the Hindi belt. This was not merely a case of the BJP replacing Congress in the region; it was also a case of pre-existing socio-cultural sensibilities transforming themselves with more militant articulation and the politics of Hindutva smoothly taking over the region. The rise of the BJP in the 1990s and its resurgence in 2014 owe much to the party’s impressive performance here: The BJP won 178 seats in the Hindi belt in 2019.
Without underestimating the party’s respectable showing elsewhere, like in Gujarat, one can therefore pinpoint the Hindi belt as the BJP’s core constituency. The Ram Janmabhoomi agitation consolidated the politics of Hindutva in the Hindi belt but historically, Hindutva politics has had more traction in this belt than elsewhere even before the BJP spearheaded the Ayodhya agitation. Throughout the nationalist movement and subsequently in the post-Independence period, Congress in the Hindi belt struggled to accommodate the more articulate Hindu sensibilities that sought public expression of religious identity. The Hindu sensibility in this belt could easily be converted into a politics of Hindu assertion to be weaponised against Muslims — irrespective of the fact that in states like Rajasthan or MP, like in Gujarat, the Muslim presence is far too weak to be competitive or a challenge to the so-called Hindu ethos. Hindutva was being shaped in the region despite the weakness of the party of Hindutva, and post-1989, it converted its subterranean existence into the electoral strength of the BJP.
Thus, there is a long term link of Hindutva with region-specific Hindu sensibilities. Today, what are the possible limitations that might unsettle the BJP’s electoral hold over this region?
Three things need to be borne in mind. First, except Bihar, where the BJP had a state-level partner, the BJP’s vote share in all the remaining states in the Hindi belt was between 50 and 60-plus per cent in 2019. This translates into a huge Hindu vote since available data suggest that Muslims might not have voted for the BJP in any sizeable proportion. In other words, the Hindu consolidation that the BJP aims at has almost completely occurred in this belt. This is often understood as the strength of the BJP but it also means that the party reaches a point where it cannot further add to its support.
Secondly, the party has won nearly all the seats in many of these states. In UP, though, it still came up short — with 60-plus seats out of 80. In other states of the region, even if the BJP were to repeat its 2019 performance, that would not help the party add to its strength. Thus, for the BJP to improve on its 2019 performance, it is absolutely essential to win more seats in UP. It cannot win many more seats in Bihar given that it is again in alliance with state-level parties and thus has to share seats with them.
Thirdly, while the popularity of Modi and the attraction of Hindutva may still hold, a decade-long incumbency coupled with exaggerated promises put the BJP in a tough corner. In this decade and overall, Hindutva has offered its followers symbolic excitement mostly unrelated to life conditions — the systematic marginalisation of the imagined enemy, construction of the Ram temple and limited accommodation of backward castes. The promises of national reconstruction and material advancement as corollaries of Hindu domination have remained distant dreams. Lokniti’s pre-election survey in late March found that in this region, 60 per cent voters mentioned price rise and unemployment as issues that will determine their vote. This proportion was higher than in the south or east.
This brings us to the question: Will the Hindi belt continue to be enchanted by Hindutva despite economic issues and despite the Hindutva rhetoric reaching a crescendo? Many have commented on “Modi fatigue” but is it possible that there will also be a “Hindutva fatigue”? This is not to say that the Hindi belt will suddenly turn away from Hindutva. But the question we must ponder is: Will the voters, in spite of their love affair with Hindutva, begin to exercise agency, make assessment of factors like performance and explore alternatives?
That process, if it begins, will not be confined to any one state from the Hindi belt. As pointed out above, despite state specificities, the region tends to manifest a somewhat uniform trend. Therein lies the challenge for the BJP. If there is Hindutva fatigue, it will manifest in varying degrees, across the region. If the BJP sheds its excess weight gained since 2014 in the region, that could result in the doors of electoral competition being pushed ajar.
When the campaign began, the competition appeared to be favouring the incumbent. As it closes, the central question that has arisen is whether the north, that periodically distances itself from dominant power holders, will unsettle the BJP, will begin to put it on notice or continue to latch on to the emotive appeal of Hindutva for the time being.
The writer, based in Pune, taught political science
